How to deal with the Resolution of Financial Market Infrastructures.  2ND INTERIM REPORT OF THE CEPS TASK FORCE ON IMPLEMENTING FINANCIAL SECTOR RESOLUTION. 
OCTOBER 2016 by Huertas, Thomas
 HOW TO DEAL WITH THE RESOLUTION 
OF FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES  
 
2ND INTERIM REPORT 
 OF THE 
CEPS TASK FORCE 
 ON 
IMPLEMENTING FINANCIAL SECTOR RESOLUTION 
OCTOBER 2016 
 
Abstract 
Financial market infrastructures (FMIs) are the backbone of the financial system: they enable 
market participants to transact with one another in an efficient manner. FMIs are inherently 
systemic, as their very names imply: payments systems, central securities depositories (CSDs), 
securities settlement systems (SSSs), central counterparties (CCPs) and trade repositories 
(TRs). If an FMI were to cease operation, it could put a stop to payments and/or securities and 
derivatives transactions. This in turn could destabilise financial markets and possibly the 
economy at large. 
To avoid such an outcome, steps should be taken to ensure that FMIs’ critical economic 
functions continue, even if a particular FMI  were to fail. Theoretically, if one FMI fails, market 
participants could shift to another or start a new one. That could be enough to ensure 
continuity. Practically, however, more will be required. FMIs will need to become robust. By 
robust we mean two things: that the FMI is extremely unlikely to fail, and that the FMI is 
resolvable, if it were to fail. To this end, FMIs should prepare recovery plans and authorities 
should prepare resolution plans. This report highlights the issues that such plans should 
consider and outlines some options for how the plans might address them 
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HOW TO DEAL WITH THE RESOLUTION  
OF FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES  
2ND INTERIM REPORT 
 OF THE 
CEPS TASK FORCE ON IMPLEMENTING FINANCIAL SECTOR RESOLUTION 
Introduction 
Financial market infrastructures (FMIs) are the backbone of the financial system: they enable 
market participants to transact with one another in an efficient manner. FMIs are inherently 
systemic, as their very names imply: payments systems, securities settlement systems (SSSs) 
and central counterparties (CCPs).1 If an FMI were to cease operation, it could put a stop to 
payments and/or securities and derivatives transactions. That in turn could destabilise 
financial markets and possibly the economy at large. 
In effect, FMIs are ‘single points of failure’: they reduce risk as long as they remain robust, but 
they concentrate risk and serve as a conduit for contagion if they fail. Moreover, the risks posed 
by FMIs are highly correlated. Each G-SIB is generally a member of several FMIs (see Annex 
1), so if a G-SIB enters resolution many or all FMIs may come under pressure at the same time. 
Two responses are in order: first, to make FMIs less likely to require resolution; and, second 
to improve the resolution regime applicable to FMIs. Considerable progress has been made 
with respect to the first item. As a result of post-crisis reforms to regulation and supervision, 
the G-SIBs that are the most significant FMI participants are much less likely to fail. And, 
thanks to resolution reform, if such a G-SIB were to fail, there is a much greater likelihood that 
the bank can be stabilised and restructured without taxpayer support. Even if a participant 
does default on its obligations to an FMI, this does not imply that the FMI itself will enter 
resolution. For example, under EMIR, CCPs are required to be able to withstand the 
simultaneous default of their two largest counterparties (‘Cover 2’).2 So the failure of an FMI 
should be an extremely rare event, a ‘tail of the tail’ risk.  
But it is an event that could conceivably occur, and if it did, it could have catastrophic 
consequences. It is therefore of the utmost importance that FMIs are resolvable, i.e. that each 
FMI can fail, be restructured and resume operations, all without receiving taxpayer support.3 
To this end the FSB has developed key attributes for an effective resolution regime for FMIs; 
the FSB and the European Commission are now considering legislation that would implement 
                                                     
1 Note that FMIs also include central securities depositories and trade depositories. For an overview of 
FMIs see CPSS-IOSCO (2012) Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures. In the United States, the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) has designated a number of financial market utilities as 
systemic and subjected these to enhanced oversight and supervision. See FSOC (2012).  
2 Note that under CPSS-IOSCO (2012), ‘Cover 2’ is required for CCPs either involved in riskier activities 
or systemically important in multiple jurisdictions. All other CCPs should maintain sufficient financial 
resources to cover potential losses, including the default of the counterparty with which the CCPs have 
the largest credit exposure (‘Cover 1’). 
3 Theoretically, if one FMI fails, market participants could shift to another or start a new one. That could 
be enough to create continuity. Practically, however, such substitutability is extremely difficult to 
achieve, particularly under stressed market conditions and within the compressed timeframe necessary 
to maintain financial stability. 
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such attributes for FMIs in the EU. This will require that FMIs prepare recovery plans4 and 
that relevant authorities prepare resolution plans.5 This report highlights the issues that such 
plans should consider and outlines some options for how the plans might address them. 
1. FMI basics 
Before delving into the complexities of FMI recovery and resolution, it might be helpful to 
provide a brief overview of how FMIs operate. In general, FMIs are structured on a hub and 
spoke principle (see Figure 1), with the FMI at the centre. Each spoke has two stages: the first 
contains the members in the FMI (e.g. member A). From each of the members spokes extend 
in turn to their clients. As a result, any client of an FMI member can transact with any client of 
any other member of the FMI. 
Figure 1. FMIs are hub and spoke organisations 
 
 
Even this brief description throws up some key issues. The first concerns the role of the FMI 
itself. Does it merely provide technology (e.g. to enable participants to calculate their 
obligations to one another and settle mutual obligations)? Or does the FMI interpose itself as 
counterparty between the clearing members, assuming financial risk? 
If the FMI is merely a technology or service provider, operational continuity is the principal 
concern. The failure of an FMI member is unlikely to pose an immediate threat to the FMI. 
Although the FMI can itself go bankrupt, it should be possible for the administrator to continue 
                                                     
4 CPMI-IOSCO (2015) sets out the standards for FMI recovery plans. 
5 FSB (2014 – pp. 57-74) sets out standards for FMI resolution plans. 
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to operate the technology so that the FMI may continue to provide the core services (as the 
actual settlement occurs off the balance sheet of the FMI).  
By contrast, if the FMI interposes itself as counterparty between the clearing members, then 
the failure of the FMI may make it impossible for the FMI to continue operations. Recovery 
and resolution plans for the FMI aim to prevent such a disruption, and these are the principal 
concerns of this report. 
The second issue concerns the point at which and the terms on which a transaction (and the 
associated liability) passes from the ‘sending’ clearing member to the FMI and from the FMI 
to the ‘receiving’ clearing member. In general, FMIs are organised on the principle that 
transactions sent to the FMI are irrevocable as soon as they pass validation and conditionality 
checks, or pass milestones set in the FMI’s rules and are accepted by the FMI (sender finality). 
Upon acceptance of the sender’s instruction, or at a defined point in accordance with its rules, 
the FMI credits the receiver. At this point the transaction becomes final and unconditional 
(receiver or settlement finality).6  
In some cases a transaction sent to the FMI is contingent on the sender’s receiving a transaction 
of equal value from the recipient via the FMI. For example, in securities settlement systems, 
transactions are generally on a ‘delivery versus payment’ basis. The FMI will only deliver 
securities to the buyer and funds to the seller if it has received funds from the buyer (for 
delivery to the seller) and securities from the seller (for delivery to the buyer). 
The third issue concerns the interval between the transaction or trade date and the value date 
on which final settlement occurs through the FMI. Although considerable compression 
between trade and settlement dates has already occurred, an interval remains for some 
transactions, especially in securities, so that some transactions may be ‘in flight’ if a participant 
fails. 7  FMI rules must clearly state how such transactions should be handled, and this 
treatment should be reflected in the resolution plans for both the FMI and its participants. 
The fourth issue concerns the ownership of FMIs. Some FMIs are owned and operated by 
public authorities, such as central banks. Others are private entities, either mutually owned by 
the clearing members or separately owned by third parties (some of whom may be publicly 
listed and traded). The ownership structure shapes incentives; it gives rise to governance 
issues and may affect competition. That in turn will have a bearing on recovery and resolution 
for the FMI.8 
This report deals principally with the resolution of private-entity FMIs. We assume that the 
public authorities will ensure that the FMIs under their ownership and operation (e.g. central 
bank payment systems such as TARGET) remain robust at all times. In this report we deal 
                                                     
6 Within the EU this issue is very clearly regulated by the Settlement Finality Directive (2009/44/EC) 
and Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements (CPSS-IOSCO, 2012, pp. 64-66).  
7 Practice in this area varies considerably. In real time gross settlement payment systems the interval 
between transaction initiation and transaction finality is effectively zero. This eliminates the possibility 
of in-flight transactions and reduces risk to the sender and receiver. In addition, in RTGS systems 
operated by central banks, the FMI (i.e. the central bank) generally guarantees the payments initiated 
over the system so that the receiver is protected against the failure of the sender. By contrast, in many 
securities settlement systems, there is an interval of at least one business day between the trade date 
and the settlement date. Although delivery versus payment (DVP) reduces settlement and counterparty 
risk to the seller and to the buyer, both the seller and the buyer effectively have replacement risk, if the 
buyer fails to pay or the seller fails to deliver. 
8 For a discussion with respect to central bank FMIs see (CPMI-IOSCO, 2015). 
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mainly with potential or actual failure of private-entity FMIs due to i) the failure of one or 
more participants in the FMI; and ii) the failure of the FMI itself (whilst each of its members 
remains in good condition).9 Furthermore, we focus on payment systems, securities settlement 
systems and central counterparties, especially for derivative transactions.  
2. Key attributes of effective resolution regimes for FMIs 
The FSB has developed a set of key attributes for effective resolution regimes for FMIs (FSB, 
2014). This adapts the key attributes developed in connection with bank resolution to the 
business of an FMI. This is fairly straightforward for most attributes. Three problems pose 
difficulties, however: the need for coordination between resolution at the failed bank and 
recovery/resolution at the FMI; the dividing line between recovery and resolution at the FMI 
and the ultimate objective the FMI resolution should seek to achieve: continuity or closure. 
The similarities to the key attributes for banks relate to i) the need for the FMI to develop a 
recovery plan as well as ii) the need for jurisdictions to: designate a resolution authority for the 
FMI; endow that authority with certain powers; and mandate that the authority develop a 
resolution plan for the FMI.  
In particular, resolution regimes for FMIs should mandate that FMIs engage in ongoing 
recovery planning as well as ongoing resolution planning. The recovery plan should 
demonstrate that the FMI would remain viable if a participant defaults (in the case of a CCP, 
it should remain viable, even if its largest or two of its largest clearing members were to fail at 
the same time).10  
To prepare for the possibility that the FMI may not be able to recover (so that resolution is 
required), jurisdictions should designate a resolution authority for each FMI. This authority 
should be empowered to act as or appoint an administrator or conservator to resolve the FMI 
(should it become necessary to do so) in cooperation with central banks and other authorities.11 
The resolution regime should provide the resolution authority with a complete kit of 
resolution tools so that the resolution authority has  
 the power and the capacity to ensure the continued provision of the critical functions 
of an FMI in resolution and to fulfil the FMI’s payment and settlement obligations 
on time, including on the day that the FMI enters into resolution, until the FMI is 
restored to viability or those functions transferred, replaced by another provider or 
wound down in an orderly manner.12 
The tool kit should include the power (subject to a ‘no creditor worse off’ [than in liquidation] 
safeguard)13 to allocate losses and to allocate or terminate contracts, to transfer the FMI’s 
                                                     
9 Note that the FMI can also fail due to operational or technical reasons external (e.g. earthquakes, power 
failures, hacking) or internal to the FMI (e.g. defect in FMI’s software).  
10 In particular, FMI recovery plans (especially the need for a sound risk management framework) 
should be consistent with the CPSS-IOSCO (2012) and take into account the guidance in the CPMI-
IOSCO (2014) report on Recovery of financial market infrastructures. 
11 FSB (2014, pp. 59-60) 
12 Note that the FMI may need to have access to liquidity in order to meet payment and settlement 
obligations on time. The Key Attributes document is silent as to where the FMI might obtain such 
liquidity, if needed (FSB, 2014, p. 62). 
13 Note, however, that this safeguard may be difficult to implement, especially in the case of CCPs, as it 
may require estimates of the proceeds that a clearing member could have realised, if recourse were 
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critical functions to a solvent third party or bridge institution and to impose a moratorium on 
payments to general creditors.14 In addition, steps should be taken to assure that the entry of 
the FMI into resolution does not automatically trigger participants’ rights to terminate or close 
out their contracts with the FMI.15 At a minimum, the resolution authority for the FMI should 
be given the power to impose a stay on the ability of participants to exercise such rights solely 
on the grounds that the FMI entered resolution.16  
Furthermore, the FSB recommends that jurisdictions consider establishing a Resolution Fund 
to facilitate the resolution of FMIs, similar to the resolution fund established for banks. This 
would be in addition to any default fund established by the FMI itself. If this Resolution Fund 
has access to funding from the government, care should be taken to ensure that taxpayers 
suffer no loss in connection with such funding. If necessary to repay the government in full, 
the Resolution Fund should be able to levy the FMI, its creditors (including FMI participants) 
or, as a last resort, participants in the financial system as a whole.17 
Finally, jurisdictions should mandate that the resolution authority develop a resolution plan 
for the FMI. The resolution plan should contemplate scenarios where  
 the FMI has already implemented loss-sharing arrangements and exhausted any default 
fund; 
 there may be no existing alternative provider to which the resolution authority might 
transfer the critical economic functions of the failed FMI; and/or 
 there may be obstacles to resolution and/or to the ability of the FMI to execute its recovery 
plan.18 
The resolution plan should take systemic effects (e.g. on participants as well as on markets and 
on other FMIs) into account as well as identify and implement appropriate reporting, 
disclosure and information-sharing arrangements with participants, other FMIs, authorities in 
other relevant jurisdictions and the market as a whole.19 
The entry of an FMI into resolution poses significant problems. According to the FSB, 
resolution should be initiated if the FMI “is, or is likely to be no longer viable … and has no 
reasonable prospect of returning to viability within a reasonable timeframe”.20 In particular, 
entry into resolution should be possible, if the FMI’s recovery plan has failed, or is likely to 
fail, to restore the FMI to viability.21 But these are quite general principles. To put the principles 
                                                     
made to tear-ups or other market-wide measures at a time of severe stress in financial markets. For 
further discussion, see (Gracie, 2015). 
14 However, such a moratorium should not extend to payments due by the FMI to its participants or to 
any linked FMI (FSB, 2014, pp. 62-64). 
15 FSB (2014, p. 65). 
16 However, participants would be able to exercise such rights, if the FMI were to fail to make cash 
payments when due (FSB, 2014, p. 65). 
17 Note that the person(s) among the creditor hierarchy of FMIs to bear the cost of resolution remains a 
highly controversial question. This has so far been a major impediment to the development of final 
international standards and regulations for CCP resolution (FSB, 2014, p. 65). 
18  Such obstacles may include deficiencies in service agreements, collateral arrangements, legal 
agreements, netting arrangements and/or liquidity provision (FSB, 2014, pp. 68-69). 
19 Ibid. pp. 69-70. 
20 Ibid. pp. 64-65. 
21 Ibid. p. 65.  In particular, entry into resolution should be possible, if 
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into practice, three problems must be solved, particularly when the threat to the FMI emanates 
from the failure of one of the FMI’s clearing members.  
The first is interconnection between resolution of a failed participant and recovery/resolution 
at the FMIs in which the failed participant participates. As outlined in the 1st Interim Report, 
if the failed participant is a bank, it will – under certain resolution plans – be able to continue 
to meet its obligations to the FMI. If so, the FMI need not even start its recovery process. By 
contrast, if the FMI takes the entry into resolution as the occasion to terminate its contracts 
with the failed bank and end the failed bank’s access to the FMI, the FMI may prevent the 
stabilisation of the failed bank and trigger the need for the FMI itself to initiate recovery and 
possibly resolution procedures. So coordination in both planning for and executing resolution 
can benefit both the failed bank and the FMI. 
The need for such coordination is acute and can arise suddenly, because failing to meet an 
obligation to an FMI may indicate that the bank has reached the point of non-viability.22 In the 
event that a clearing member cannot pay the amount that it owes at the deadline for settlement, 
the FMI will generally provide a short grace period to the member to enable it to cure the 
default. If the member cannot immediately draw upon own resources to make the payment 
directly, the member may appeal to the central bank (if it has access to central bank facilities) 
to provide it with the liquidity that the member needs in order to meet its obligation to the 
FMI. The central bank must make a quick assessment as to whether the member:  
 is fundamentally in sound condition, but temporarily illiquid. In this case, it will generally 
be sensible for the central bank to extend credit to the member against the pledge of sound 
collateral, as this will avoid putting either the member or the FMI into resolution. 
 has reached the point of non-viability (and is therefore likely to enter resolution), but is 
likely to be able to be stabilised via bail-in of “reserve capital”23 only. In this case, it will 
generally be sensible for the central bank to extend credit to the member against the pledge 
of unencumbered assets, as this will enable the FMI to settle, restrict resolution to the failed 
bank (and facilitate the bank-in-resolution’s continued access to the payments system) and 
limit contagion.  
 has reached the point of non-viability (and is therefore likely to enter resolution), but is not 
likely to be stabilised via the bail-in of reserve capital. In this case, it may make sense for 
the central bank to refrain from extending credit immediately to the bank in resolution, 
and have the FMI implement its recovery plan.  
The central bank will also need to consider the knock-on effects of this decision, however. 
These can be quite significant, especially where the member failing to meet its obligation is a 
                                                     
i. recovery measures available to the FMI, including the use of its available assets and 
default resources and the application of any loss allocation rules, are exhausted and have 
failed to return the FMI to viability and continuing compliance with applicable legal and 
regulatory requirements, or are not being implemented in a timely manner; or  
ii. the relevant oversight, supervisory or resolution authority determines that the recovery 
measures available to the FMI are not likely to return the FMI to viability within the 
timeframe required to enable continued compliance with applicable legal and regulatory 
requirements, or that they are otherwise likely to compromise financial stability. 
22 To assure that banks are monitoring their liquidity situation properly, supervisors have mandated 
that banks improve their intra-day liquidity reporting. For details, see BCBS (2013). 
23 By ‘reserve capital’ we mean instruments other than CET1 capital that qualify as TLAC (e.g. AT1 and 
Tier 2 capital as well as qualifying senior debt). 
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G-SIB, for such institutions tend to be clearing members and settlement agents in most of the 
principal FMIs (see Annex 1). Thus, the failure of a G-SIB is likely to put pressure on several 
FMIs at the same time. 
Without receipt of payment from the bank entering resolution, each of the FMIs in which the 
bank-in-resolution is a member may have to initiate its recovery plan and in an extreme case, 
may find it difficult to make payments as scheduled to the other clearing members. If one or 
more of these FMIs does not pay on schedule, contagion could occur: one or more of the other 
clearing members that had been expecting a payment from the FMI could themselves 
encounter a liquidity shortfall. Consequently, central bank(s) should consider whether (and 
on what terms) they would provide credit to the FMI and/or to its non-defaulting clearing 
members. 
Given the interconnections between FMIs and G-SIBs the maintenance of financial stability 
requires coordination and cooperation: 
 among the supervisor, resolution authority and central bank of the FMI; and 
 between the authorities (supervisor, resolution authority, central bank) responsible for 
each of the clearing members and the authorities responsible for the FMI. 
This is a formidable challenge. It is even more so if supervision or resolution is assigned to a 
college that itself has to reach a collective decision before it can interact with other authorities 
(as is the case for FMIs in the EU under EMIR). 
The second problem concerns the dividing line between recovery and resolution. At what 
point should resolution start and control pass from the FMI to the resolution authority of the 
FMI? Once control passes to the resolution authority, should the resolution authority be bound 
by the rules of the FMI? This is quite a significant question, especially with respect to central 
counterparties.24 
The third problem concerns the objective that resolution should aim to achieve: continuity or 
closure. The FSB’s Key Attributes allows for both: 
An effective resolution regime for FMIs should pursue financial stability and allow for 
the continuity of critical FMI functions without exposing taxpayers to loss, either by 
restoring the ability of the FMI to perform those functions as a going concern or ensuring the 
performance of those functions by another entity or arrangement coupled with the orderly 
wind-down of the FMI in resolution.25  
In practice, resolution plans must choose one objective or the other, and the actions required 
will differ according to the objective chosen. This is especially relevant in the case of central 
counterparties. 
We now turn to a discussion of resolution at each type of FMI. 
                                                     
24 For discussion, see (FSB 2016, pp. 14-15). 
25 Emphasis added. When pursuing closure as the objective of resolution, note that it may be difficult to 
transfer the functions of a large CCP due to the capital and operational requirement that would thereby 
be imposed on the transferee CCP. Also, when they are not multiple, robust CCPs that would make 
transfer of all products a realistic possibility, closure of CCP may no longer be a viable option (FSB, 
2014, p. 58). 
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3. Resolution of payment systems 
Payment systems are crucial to the operation of a modern economy.26 There are both public 
(government-owned) and private payment systems (see Table 1 for examples). Here we focus 
on issues relating to the resolution of private payment systems, on the rationale that systems 
owned and operated by governments or central banks cannot fail for financial reasons and 
will therefore not require resolution.27 
Table 1. Payment systems 
Government/central bank systems Private systems 
TARGET  RTGS system owned and 
operated by ECB 
EURO 1 EBA Clearing RTGS-equivalent net 
settlement system 
FEDWIRE RTGS system owned and 
operated by Federal 
Reserve  
CHIPS RTGS-equivalent net 
settlement system 
operated by The 
Clearing House 
 
Private payment systems generally act as a technology provider. In such cases, the role of the 
payment system is restricted to calculating the net amount that each participant is due to pay 
or receive at the point of settlement. The actual settlement occurs on the books of the central 
bank, via special purpose zero-balance accounts. The system itself is not counterparty to the 
participating banks and has no direct exposure to the failure of a participating bank. 
Law and regulation as well as the rules of the private payment systems limit systemic risk. 
Large-value payment systems have generally eliminated or severely restricted overdrafts to 
sending members. Systems only accept payment instructions from clearing members if the 
sender has sufficient funds in its reserve account in order to cover the payment at settlement, 
and the system either immediately debits the sender’s reserve account or places a hold on the 
account for the amount due at settlement. Payments sent into the system are final and 
irrevocable (sender finality) as soon as the system accepts the payment.  
Moreover, payments settle very quickly. Indeed, the principal high-value payments systems 
settle immediately in real time. For those systems settling on a deferred net settlement basis, 
settlement now occurs at frequent intervals during the business day and at the latest at the end 
of the business day on which the payment is initiated. Finally, payments received from the 
system are final, as soon as the system credits the amount to the bank of the beneficiary 
(receiver finality). Together, these arrangements assure that receiving banks are insulated from 
the failure of sending banks and that the payment system itself is robust (able to withstand the 
simultaneous failure of two of its largest participants). 
4. Resolution of foreign exchange and securities settlement systems  
Foreign exchange settlement systems facilitate the completion of foreign exchange 
transactions. Securities settlement systems (SSSs) transfer ownership of securities from the 
                                                     
26 For a discussion of payments systems see (CPSS-IOSCO, 2012, pp. 148-151) 
27 In addition, central banks generally guarantee any payment accepted into the system, so that the 
receiving bank is not exposed to the risk that the sending bank will fail. 
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seller to the buyer.28 Without such systems, neither securities nor foreign exchange markets 
can function efficiently. Assuring that such systems are robust is therefore vital to the 
maintenance of financial stability. 
As noted above, foreign exchange and securities settlement systems are intertwined with 
payment systems. These are used to effect the cash payments due under foreign exchange 
transactions as well as the cash leg of securities transactions. As we did with payments 
systems, we focus on private systems either mutually owned by their members or by third 
parties. We assume, for the purpose of this report, that government-owned systems cannot 
fail, and will therefore not require resolution.29 
4.1 The basics of FX settlement  
Foreign exchange settles on a conditional basis. The seller delivers the currency (foreign 
exchange) sold to the buyer via a payment in that currency into the buyer’s account at the 
central bank for that currency, whilst the buyer pays ‘domestic’ currency into the seller’s 
account at the ‘domestic’ central bank. Hence, the settlement is payment versus payment 
(PVP). The role of the foreign exchange settlement system is to calculate the amounts parties 
are due to pay and due to receive, to monitor that the parties actually make the payments 
when due, and release the payments to their beneficiaries if and only if it can verify that the 
parties have actually made the required payments.30 
4.2 The basics of securities settlement 
Securities settlement for equities and bonds occurs within the broader framework of securities 
markets administration principally provided by central security depositories,31 supplemented 
by registrars, issuing and paying agents and custodians. This framework does three things:  
1. It reconciles the amount of each security outstanding with the amount issued (taking into 
account the effect of corporate actions, redemptions and new issues). 
2. It safeguards, immobilises and dematerialises securities so that they may be traded in 
electronic form. 
3. It records the ownership of outstanding securities and provides for the segregation of client 
assets.  
When a security is sold, the buyer and seller first need to confirm the details of the security 
sold, the number of units sold, the price at which the sale will take place, the identity of the 
buyer and seller and the settlement instructions (sometimes called ‘matching’). Settlement 
then follows: the transfer of securities from the seller’s account to the buyer’s account at the 
SSS. The sale process is complete, and the obligation of the buyer and seller to each other is 
                                                     
28 For a discussion of securities settlement systems see CPSS-IOSCO (2012, pp. 152-55). The analysis 
presented here is also relevant to foreign exchange settlement systems that settle on a payment versus 
payment (PVP) basis. For further details see (CLS, 2016). 
29 This is the path that governments have generally elected to take with respect to government bonds, 
and it is the path that the ECB has elected to take via the formation of Target 2 for securities. 
30 For a further explanation see CLS (2016). Note that CLS now plays a fundamental role in the FX 
market by providing PVP settlement services of 18 currencies among its 66 members. However, FX 
transactions not covered by CLS have much higher exposure to settlement risks. 
31 For a description of activities and risks of CSDs see CPSS-IOSCO (2012, pp. 64-66). Note that in some 
cases the CSD may act as custodian and/or registrar. It may own and/or operate the securities 
settlement system. The CSD may also engage in securities lending, either as principal or agent.  
10 | THOMAS F. HUERTAS 
 
discharged only when the transfer is final in accordance with the SSS’s rules (i.e. unconditional 
and irrevocable).  
For most securities there is an interval between the trade and settlement dates. This creates 
some risk that either the buyer or seller will fail before the settlement becomes final. 32 
Shortening the interval (in the European Union the CSD Regulation has harmonised this at 
two days [T+2]) therefore reduces settlement risk. So does the requirement (contained in 
MiFID 2) that all securities transacted on trading platforms be centrally cleared. 
In most cases, SSSs transfer securities on a delivery-versus-payment (DVP) basis so that the 
SSS delivers the sold securities to the buyer, if and only if the buyer delivers the requisite 
amount of funds to the SSS for the account of the seller. Strictly speaking, under DVP the SSS 
has no direct exposure to either the buyer or the seller. Securities remain the property of the 
seller, and funds the property of the buyer, until such time as the DVP transaction becomes 
final (irrevocable and unconditional). The SSS is not counterparty to either the seller or the 
buyer; it merely facilitates the process by which the buyer and seller can settle their obligations 
to one another. Correspondingly, the SSS itself should not be threatened by the failure of either 
the buyer or seller.33 
5. Resolution of central counterparties 
With respect to futures and derivatives, central counterparties (CCPs)34 clear all exchange-
traded products35 as well as a growing range of standardised OTC products (FSB, 2015b). 
Greater use of central counterparties in connection with derivatives is one of the principal 
tenets of the financial reform programme enacted since 2008. Indeed, the authorities have 
made clearing through CCPs for standardised products, such as interest rate swaps and credit 
derivatives, mandatory.36 To facilitate the shift of OTC derivatives to central clearing, the Basel 
                                                     
32 In the EU, the Regulation on Settlement and Central Securities Depositories (CSDR) sets out the 
uniform obligations for the settlements of financial instruments and requirements for the organisation 
and conduct of central securities depositories (CSDs). In particular, in addressing settlement failures, it 
imposes a mandatory buy-in process that should be initiated when financial instruments are not 
delivered by the failing participant within 4 business days of the intended settlement date (Art. 7). 
33 However, a CSD affiliated with the SSS could be adversely affected, if, in the course of providing 
participants with ancillary services such as custody and securities lending, the CSD had 
 lent securities as principal to the seller to enable the seller to meet its delivery obligation; 
 lent cash to the buyer to meet its payment obligation (subject to the quality of any collateral); or 
 guaranteed the performance of the seller and/or buyer. 
However, the CSDR requires the CSD to ring-fence the SSS. The CSDR also specifies the group of CSDs 
that provide banking-type ancillary services and details the requirements for its authorisation, 
including additional capital surcharge and an adequate recovery plan to ensure continuity of CSDs 
critical functions in situations when liquidity or credit risk crystallises as a result of conducting banking-
type business. 
34 For an overview of CCPs see Norman (2011). 
35 This includes all securities and repos based on securities collateral. According to ICMA’s most recent 
semi-annual European Repo Market Survey (conducted June 2015), around 27% of outstanding repos 
by value are cleared through a central clearing counterparty (ICMA, 2015). 
36 However, coordination problems arise due to the disjointed implementation process for designating 
derivatives subject to central clearing, the counterparties to which the requirement applies, and the 
CCPs that the counterparties may use to fulfil the mandatory clearing requirement.  
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III Accord differentiated between cleared and uncleared derivatives, imposing a higher capital 
charge on the latter.37 As a result, CCPs clear an increasing proportion of total derivative 
transactions.38 Correspondingly, it is increasingly important that CCPs be resolvable.39 
5.1 The basics of CCPs  
CCPs both transfer and mutualise risk. Although risk transfer was the primary motivation for 
imposing mandatory clearing, most CCPs would regard themselves principally as system 
operators that facilitate the mutualisation of risk among the market participants who choose 
to act as clearing members.40 Accordingly in the CCP business model, the CCP operator should 
hold resources to protect against operational and business risks and, if necessary, to manage 
an orderly wind-down. In the eyes of most CCPs (but not their members!) the CCP itself 
should not be accountable for losses arising from member default: that should be the 
responsibility of the clearing members in accordance with the rules of the CCP. 
A CCP becomes principal to all trades with its clearing members. The CCP is a buyer to every 
seller and a seller to every buyer. CCPs predominantly use two methods to effect this 
transformation. Both novation41 and open offer42 provide market participants with the legal 
                                                     
37 Effective 1 January 2017, final standards for the capital requirements of CCP-cleared transactions will 
come into force. Banks’ default fund contributions to QCCPs will then be calculated based on a risk-
sensitive formula, while at the same time all capital charges on banks’ exposures to qualifying CCPs 
(including both trade exposures and default fund contributions) are capped so that the total amount 
will not exceed the sum applied to transactions with non-qualifying CCPs. A qualifying CCP is defined 
as “an entity that is licensed to operate as a CCP (including a license granted by way of confirming an 
exemption), and is permitted by the appropriate regulator/overseer to operate as such with respect to 
the products offered” (BCBS, 2014). 
38 65% of interest rate derivatives were centrally cleared at mid-year 2015, up from 50% at year-end 2011 
SIFMA Statistics. For credit derivatives 60 to 80% of new transactions in the US are eligible for central 
clearing; 40 to 60% in the EU. And, for commodity, equity and foreign exchange derivatives less than 
20% of new transactions can be centrally cleared in most jurisdictions. See FSB (2015a). 
39 For discussion of resolution of CCPs see (FSB 2016), Gracie (2015), Duffie (2015), Tucker (2013) and 
Wendt (2015). 
40 As summarised by LCH, “By acting as the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer, CCPs 
reduce counterparty risk, absorb shocks and help to prevent the build-up of excessive risk in the 
financial system.” However, the CCP itself is “essentially a risk management system through which [the 
members] can mitigate their counterparty risk and benefit from other services; e.g., portfolio 
compression. The CCP operator is responsible for the design and functioning of this system, and 
primarily has operational and business risks.” 
41 Through novation, the original contract between the buyer and seller is terminated and 
simultaneously replaced by two new contracts that have come into existence, i.e., one between CCP and 
the buyer and the other between CCP and the seller, so that CCP assumes the original buyer and seller’s 
contractual obligations to each other. Novation is appropriate when a binding contractual relationship 
already exists between the original buyer and seller at the moment the transaction details are registered 
and matched in the trading system, and hence in order for a counterparty to function, the original 
obligations need to be extinguished. 
42 Where all pre-agreed conditions are met, a CCP extends an open offer to act as a counterparty to 
market participants and is therefore automatically and immediately interposed in a transaction the 
moment a trade is executed. Compared with novation, in an open-offer system the buyer and seller 
never have a contractual relationship as CCP steps in at the exact point that matching occurs. 
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certainty that CCP is obligated to effect the transaction.43 As a result, for transactions cleared 
via the CCP the buyer and seller have no exposure to one another. Instead, they each have 
exposure to the CCP. 
In aggregate, CCPs achieve very significant risk reduction. This occurs in two stages. The first 
(bilateral) stage effectively interposes the CCP as counterparty between the two market 
participants A and B, so that each has an exposure to the CCP rather than to each other (see 
Box 1).  
Box 1. How CCPs work 
CCPs can be deconstructed into two stages: bilateral and multilateral. In the bilateral stage, the 
CCP has only two clearing members, A and B. These two clearing members novate the bilateral 
OTC contracts that they make with one another to the CCP so that A and B have no direct 
exposure to one another, but are each exposed to the CCP. If A was due to have made a payment 
to B, this payment is now due to the CCP, and the CCP becomes due to make the payment to B. 
Figure 2. CCP Bilateral Stage: Novation transfers obligation from counterparty to CCP 
OTC  
 
 
Netting under mutual 
margining above nominal 
amount. Margin equal to close-
out amount 
  
Novation 
  
CCP 
   
Novation transfers contracts to 
CCP so that CCP is 
counterparty to A and to B 
 
In the multilateral stage, additional counterparties are admitted to the CCP. This produces 
further netting benefits but mutualises risk. To illustrate, take the case where a third 
counterparty C joins the CCP. It novates its transactions with A as well as its transactions with 
B to the CCP as described in the bilateral stage above. As a result, A’s obligation to/claims on 
the CCP become an amalgam of its obligations to/claims on B and C. Instead of having a claim 
on B for 10 and owing C 5, A has a claim on the CCP for 5 (see Error! Reference source not 
ound.). As a result, A has an indirect exposure to B (if B’s failure causes the CCP to fail).  
Figure 3. CCP Multilateral Stage: Netting reduces exposure but mutualises risk 
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A 0 10 -5 5 
B -10 0 15 5 
C 5 -15 0 -10 
CCP -5 -5 10 0 
 
 
                                                     
43 The open offer method is derived from the English case law that a binding contract can be achieved 
if one party (the CCP) states openly that it is willing to be contractually bound if the other party (either 
the original buyer or seller) performs certain acts (Turing, 2012). Other legal mechanisms that also allow 
CCPs to guarantee obligations include explicit and legally binding settlement guarantees, i.e., a 
transaction agreement that indicates the technical counterparty while the CCP will be liable in the case 
of counterparty default (non-payment of amounts due on the transaction settlement date). 
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The second (multilateral) stage mutualises risk. It effectively nets the payments that clearing 
member A is due to pay to or receive from each of the other clearing members into a single net 
payment that clearing member is either due to pay to or receive from the CCP. This single net 
exposure is likely to be considerably less than the aggregate bilateral counterparty exposures 
that clearing members would have incurred had the derivatives not been cleared (see Box 1).  
Clearing member default is the principal risk facing the CCP.44 If a clearing member fails to 
meet its obligations to the CCP, the CCP may experience a liquidity and/or capital shortfall. 
Operational risk at the CCP may increase, if the failed member provided payments, settlement 
and/or custody services to the CCP. The CCP (and/or its default fund) may also incur losses, 
if it invests in obligations of the failed member. 
CCPs limit their own risk principally through the requirement that clearing members post 
initial and variation margin. CCPs monitor their risk exposures and have the power to call for 
additional margin and, in extreme cases, restrict members to conducting risk-reducing 
transactions. In addition, CCP’s impose strict criteria for the admission of clearing members 
and set standards for transaction acceptance.45 This effectively ensures that – for all but the 
most extreme cases – the clearing member itself will bear the loss that its default may cause. 
To handle such extreme cases, CCPs require clearing members to contribute to a default fund. 
CCPs have clear rules regarding how they will manage default by a clearing member. The 
default management process starts with a determination by the CCP that the member is in 
default. This need not be automatic: under the rules of most CCPs, the CCP must take a 
decision to do so – a fact that is conducive to allowing for the resolution process at the clearing 
member to recapitalise the bank-in-resolution and effectively cure the default so that the CCP 
                                                     
44 Overall, CCPs face four types of risk: market, credit, liquidity and operational risk. Under business as 
usual conditions, the CCP incurs practically no market risk. Similarly, under business as usual 
conditions CCPs face limited liquidity risks. Payments to counterparties (outflows) should be balanced 
by payments from counterparties (inflows) so that net outflows are zero. Operational risk for a CCP is 
on a par with the operational risk incurred in major banks’ trading businesses. Indeed, given the CCP’s 
focus on a limited number of standardised contracts, the CCP may actually incur a much lower level of 
operational risk. 
45 CCPs reserve the right to refuse to accept transactions from members who fail – in the eyes of the CCP 
– to fulfil the CCP’s membership requirements. In addition, CCPs reserve the right to liquidate a clearing 
member’s positions at its (the CCP’s) own discretion, and/or to restrict the access of the clearing 
member to the CCP.  
Again, this could have significant implications in the event of a failing G-SIB by accelerating the slide 
of G-SIB toward the PONV. Also, if CCP excludes a member temporarily or permanently to new 
transactions, how could the member continue fulfilling its mandatory clearing obligation, especially 
when transactions cannot feasibly be transferred to another CCP for clearing or be cleared via a 
surviving clearing member? Even if the member were to receive a waiver from mandatory clearing, 
would it then trigger higher capital requirements for the non-centrally cleared OTC transactions? Note 
also that BRRD empowers the resolution authorities to temporarily suspend the termination rights of 
any party (except central banks and CCPs [BRRD Art. 71(3)]) to a contract with banks that have entered 
resolution. Proportionate restrictions could be imposed on counterparties’ rights to close out, accelerate 
or otherwise terminate financial contracts to effectively apply the resolution tools. This could create 
considerable concerns for CCPs. 
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need not start its recovery process and need not initiate the default waterfall process at all (see 
section 5.3, below).46  
If the CCP does declare the member to be in default, the defaulting member will generally not 
be able to conduct new transactions, and the CCP will close out the positions of the defaulting 
participant. This leaves the CCP with an unmatched book – it retains open positions equal and 
opposite to those the CCP had held vis-à-vis the defaulting member. In order to rebalance its 
portfolio (and return to a matched book) the CCP will conduct an auction of its open positions 
among the non-defaulting participants. Effectively, the CCP closes out the clearing member’s 
position vis-à-vis the CCP at its actual replacement cost.  
Such an auction may take time and/or may fail to rebalance the CCP’s portfolio, however. If 
so, the CCP may incur losses and/or have difficulty in making payments to non-defaulting 
participants.   
Figure 4. CCP loss-allocation waterfall  
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1 Callable up to the value of each member’s Default Fund contribution at the time of the default. 
2 The resources available in the service continuity phase are determined by the LCH Clearnet Rulebooks.  
Source: CCP Risk Management Recovery & Resolution: An LCH White Paper. 
To the extent that the close-out process generates a loss, this loss is allocated according to a 
pre-agreed ‘waterfall’ (see Figure 4) in line with the requirements established under EMIR.47 
Its key principle is ‘defaulter pays’: losses are first by resources posted by the defaulting 
clearing member (starting with defaulter’s initial margin, then its variation margin and finally 
its contribution to the CCP’s default fund).  
Any loss in excess of this amount is next allocated to the CCP itself up to the amount of the 
‘skin in the game’ contribution that the CCP is required to make to the default fund (for CCPs 
within the EU this is governed by EMIR). The amount drawn against this tranche is effectively 
the CCP’s loss on default of the failed clearing member(s). If losses still require 
                                                     
46 Note that according to the recent CPMI–IOSCO Level 3 assessment, CCPs generally have significant 
discretion in determining when to declare a clearing member default, and less discretion regarding how 
to apply resources in default waterfalls (CPMI-IOSCO, 2016, p.88)  
47 For a general discussion of loss allocation rules at CCPs, see Elliott (2013). 
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allocation/absorption, the waterfall then lands on the contributions of the non-defaulting 
members to the default fund. 
If losses incurred in the close-out process could not be fully covered by pre-funded resources 
in the default waterfall, CCPs generally have the ability to assess clearing members for 
additional contributions (‘Powers of assessments’ or ‘unfunded default fund contributions’). 
In most cases CCP also places a cap on such assessments, although the amount, structure and 
duration of these caps vary considerably among CCPs themselves.48 
Upon a complete depletion of the default fund, CCPs will require surviving members to 
contribute resources in order to replenish the default fund.49 50 (And according to EMIR, CCPs 
in the EU are required to replenish their ‘skin in the game’ contribution to the default fund 
within a month.) If the default fund cannot be replenished immediately or the replenishment 
is insufficient to cover the losses resulting from the default of the failed counterparty, the CCP 
may resort to supplemental loss allocation methods (often mandatory and ex ante agreed) as 
clearly set out in its own rulebook or imposed by law and regulation, such as margin 
haircutting or contract tear-ups.51 
Margin gains haircutting potentially enables the CCP to return to a balanced book, if the 
auction of the failed member’s positions fails to do so. Under this approach the CCP would 
withhold some portion of the margin payment that it was due to pay to clearing members, 
whilst continuing to collect in full the payment of margin that was due from members. This 
can readily be done for variation margin (VM), as the payments due to the clearing member 
are obligations of the CCP, but not for the initial margin (IM) that clearing members had 
posted. Initial margin is the property of the clearing member (and of the underlying 
investment funds and clients of the clearing member) and is generally not accessible by the 
CCP without a specific contract to that effect. In the EU EMIR protects the IM that members 
and their clients post to the CCP. Unless the owner of the IM is itself in default, the IM may 
not be used to satisfy any obligations to third parties. 
Tear-ups are a second supplemental method by which the CCP can return to a balanced book 
and stop losses that result from allowing the book to remain unbalanced.52 Under this option, 
                                                     
48 See (CPMI-IOSCO, 2016, p. 96) 
49 For example, LCH has the ability to request contingent resources, i.e., additional contributions from 
the non-defaulting participants through its ‘Assessment powers’. Non-defaulting Clearing Members 
may be obliged to make an Unfunded Contribution by reason of a 25% reduction in Default Fund for 
the first default. Following a first default, LCH may require subsequent Unfunded Contributions in 
respect of subsequent defaults provided Unfunded Contributions will not be payable in respect of any 
more than three defaults in any six-month period.  
50 CPMI-IOSCO (2016) observes that some CCPs do not clearly distinguish power of assessment for the 
purpose of loss allocation and for replenishment purposes, while others have separate rules for the two. 
This distinction also determines how the CCP caps the assessment it may make of each clearing member.  
51 There might also be exceptions to this. For example, ICE Europe allows for a ‘cooling off period’ 
during which non-defaulting clearing members are not required to replenish the default fund and are 
given an assessment limit, so that they have more time to analyse position risks, locate funding to meet 
obligations, and execute any contingency plans. A cooling-off period commences at trigger event 
including a single default, and lasts for 30 days. It is, however, applied only to FX and F&O products 
but not CDS. 
52 For a discussion of tear-ups, see Elliott (2013, p. 8) 
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the CCP closes out selected contracts from those remaining after the conclusion of the auction. 
The CCP rulebook determines the price at which the tear up will occur.  
In sum, the CCP recovery process, together with CCP risk management, goes a very long way 
to make CCPs robust. But not all the way. Three areas continue to cause concern.  
First, there is a very small probability – a tail of the tail risk – that the losses incurred by a CCP 
will exceed the amount of resources available under the ‘Cover 2’ calculation made by the 
CCP. 
Second, there is a concern that the loss allocation process may not operate quickly enough to 
ensure that the CCP can continue to provide hedging capacity to non-defaulting clearing 
members and to the market at large the ‘Monday’ following the initiation of the CCP recovery 
procedures. If the CCP is unable to make payments as scheduled to non-defaulting members 
and/or their clients, this increases liquidity pressure on such clients. If delays in execution 
obscure pricing, this may heighten uncertainty at what is already likely to be a period of 
considerable stress in financial markets. Finally, if the CCP is not in a position to accept new 
transactions, members and the market at large may find it difficult to manage their risk, 
especially with respect to standardised contracts whose clearing is concentrated in a particular 
CCP. Even if banks were granted a temporary exemption from mandatory clearing, they 
would face operational challenges and possible increases in capital requirements, if they had 
to revert to bilateral clearing.  
Third, there is some concern that the alternative loss allocation methods may themselves 
disrupt financial markets. In particular, variation margin gains haircutting (VMGH) shares 
losses unequally and unpredictably. It may also take time to fully absorb loss or be insufficient 
to absorb the losses incurred by the CCP (Duffie, 2015). This threatens contagion without 
providing the assurance that the CCP can continue its critical economic functions. Tear-ups 
(especially complete tear-ups) are likely to be extremely disruptive to financial markets and 
the economy as a whole, as a tear-up will cause some or all of the CCP’s clearing members to 
become unhedged at the same time, and require the clearing members as well as some of their 
clients to seek to rebalance their own books at a time when financial markets are already likely 
to be under considerable stress. CCPs are therefore advised to avoid using complete tear-up 
“to the extent practicable”.53 Some CCPs state that applying tear-up as a recovery tool of last 
resort incentivises clearing participants to support other recovery actions.54 
5.2 Commission proposal regarding resolution of CCPs 
The European Commission is planning to introduce legislation to govern the resolution of 
CCPs. It has not as yet tabled a formal proposal, but has informally circulated a ‘non-paper’ 
outlining the key provisions that a proposal might take. 55 According to this straw man the 
Commission’s proposal would build upon the provisions in EMIR governing the supervision 
                                                     
53 See CPMI-IOSCO (2014, p. 27).  According to the FSB, “A full tear-up of contracts is unlikely to be 
consistent with the objectives of continuity of critical clearing services and minimising contagion or 
instability. Even tools that do not require full tear-up may have financial stability implications that could 
be difficult to identify, measure and manage and therefore demand close consideration. The use of a 
tool such as partial tear-up may have implications for participants beyond replacement of contracts, 
including on netting sets.” (FSB 2016, p. 17). 
54 See CPMI-IOSCO (2016, p. 99) 
55 For a summary see European Commission, (2015). Note that the document is unofficial and not 
publicly available.  
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of CCPs as well as those requiring CCPs to develop and submit recovery plans.56 The proposal 
aims to implement the FSB Key Attributes by adapting the BRRD to the functions and business 
model of a CCP. 
The institutional arrangements closely follow those for banks under the BRRD. The legislation 
will require member states to designate a resolution authority for the CCP and equip the 
authority with “powers to undertake all the relevant preparatory and resolution actions”. Such 
powers would be harmonised across member states57 and would include the authority to  
(i) sell the CCP’s entire or critical functions to a viable competitor,  
(ii) create a publicly controlled bridge CCP, and/or  
(iii) allocate losses and positions among clearing members.58  
The resolution authority would be empowered to use such powers singly or in combination 
based on its assessment of the specific facts and circumstances and the particular CCP in 
resolution. 
The resolution authority would be mandated to develop a resolution plan for the CCP.59 The 
resolution plan should  
outline the resolution powers and tools which authorities would most likely employ 
in case a CCP meets the conditions for resolution, proportionate to and in full 
consideration of the business model, market share and systemic relevance of the CCP 
both in the jurisdiction in which it is established as well as in other member states and 
third countries.  
The plan should recognise that the failure of the CCP could result either from a multiple 
member default or from non-default scenarios. Regarding public financial support, this should 
be restricted to central bank facilities on normal terms (assuming the CCP has access to such 
facilities).60 
The plan should be developed in conjunction with other relevant authorities. Although the 
plan would not be legally binding, the home country resolution authority should inform the 
other authorities if it decides to deviate from the plan. To facilitate such cooperation member 
states would be directed to establish resolution colleges under the chairmanship of the CCP’s 
home country resolution authority. This college shall be modelled on the supervisory college 
established under EMIR and shall include all relevant authorities.61  
                                                     
56 OJ L 201 of 27.7.2012  
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R0648&from=EN). 
57 European Commission (2015) p. 3 
58 European Commission (2015) p. 8. 
59 Ibid. pp. 5-6. 
60 Ibid. p. 6. 
61 According to the Commission (EC 2015, pp. 3-4), members of the resolution college could include, in 
addition to the CCP’s resolution authority (which would act as Chair), “the competent authorities of the 
clearing members, CCPs, central securities depositories and trading venues present in the EMIR college, 
as well as the relevant central banks, and ESMA. In addition, other members could include, as 
appropriate, the resolution authorities of the clearing members whose competent authorities are 
members, if different, the relevant competent authority of any parent undertaking to which recovery 
plans could apply, any competent ministries afforded a specific role in the resolution of CCPs, and 
EBA.”  
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This is broadly in line with the FSB principles for cross-border effectiveness of resolution 
actions and the FSB 2015 CCP work plan to develop granular standards and guidance for CCP 
resolution planning, including cross-border coordination and mutual recognition of resolution 
actions (FSB, 2015c).  
Regarding the entry of a CCP into resolution, the language of the legislative proposal closely 
follows that of the BRRD for banks:  
Authorities could be able to place a CCP in resolution when it is (i) failing or likely to 
fail, (ii) no private sector alternative can avert failure, and (iii) it is in the public interest 
to do so.62  
Similarly to the BRRD, the Commission’s straw-man proposal assigns the responsibility for 
making the above determination primarily to the CCP’s competent authority (supervisor) and 
secondarily to the CCP’s resolution authority. 
Technically, this language complies with the FSB recommendation that an effective resolution 
regime should empower the resolution authority “to act promptly and before the point at 
which the chance of stabilising the CCP is lost”. 63  As a practical matter, however, the 
authorities responsible for a CCP must confront and solve two problems: i) how to coordinate 
with the authorities responsible for the resolution of a failed clearing member, and ii) when to 
initiate resolution. 
5.3 Coordination with resolution authorities of failing members  
There is considerable mutual benefit to making the response of the CCP (and its 
supervisory/resolution authorities) contingent on the decisions and actions taken by the failed 
bank’s resolution authority. Specifically, the CCP and its resolution authority should not start 
the CCP’s loss allocation waterfall without giving the resolution authority of the failed clearing 
member the opportunity to implement bail-in. If bail-in of investor obligations leads to the 
stabilisation of the bank/clearing member in resolution, the clearing member can continue to 
meet its obligations to the CCP, and the CCP need not start the loss-allocation waterfall at all 
(see Figure 5).64 
Achieving this level of coordination is a sizeable task, especially for the G-SIBs that are the 
principal dealers in derivatives and the principal clearing members in major CCPs. At a 
minimum, the resolution plans for banks will need to include provision for transmission of 
information about the status of the bank-in-resolution to the supervisory and resolution 
authorities of the CCPs in which the bank-in-resolution is a clearing member. Ideally, the CCP 
should not be able to start its loss-allocation waterfall unless it has received a ‘no objection’ 
opinion from its supervisor, and the CCP’s supervisor should be required to consult the 
                                                     
62 In addition, in line with the guidance in the relevant annex of the Financial Stability Board Key 
Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes15, a CCP could be placed in resolution even if the first two 
of these conditions are strictly speaking not met, where the application of further recovery measures by 
the CCP could prevent its failure but could compromise financial stability in the process (European 
Commission, 2015, p. 7). 
63 Specifically, the resolution authority “should be able to intervene in a timely and forward-looking 
way before the end of the waterfall” (Gracie, 2015). 
64 Such an approach would also increase the likelihood that the bank-in-resolution could continue to 
provide the CCP with payments, settlement and custody services. 
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resolution authority for the bank/clearing member in resolution prior to giving such a ‘no 
objection’ opinion. 
Under the Commission’s putative legislative proposal, 
Competent authorities could be granted specific powers to intervene in the operations 
of CCPs where their viability is at risk but before they reach the point of failure or 
where their actions would highly likely be detrimental for overall financial stability. 
These powers could be used in either a scenario where a clearing member(s) have 
defaulted …. Notably they could require the CCP to undertake specific actions in its 
recovery plan, or to refrain from taking such action.65  
Could one such specific power be the requirement that the supervisor of the CCP to coordinate 
with the resolution authority of the failed clearing member so that the CCP would refrain from 
starting its default waterfall, so as to allow bail-in to stabilise the bank in resolution? 
Figure 5. Coordination with resolution authority of failing member(s) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
   
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
The second issue is when to initiate resolution – a step that effectively transfers control from 
the management and board of the CCP to the resolution authority for the CCP. Three 
alternatives are: 
1. Immediately, upon the failure of a clearing member. This seems too soon for full resolution, 
particularly if the resolution authority of the CCP can utilise its early intervention powers 
to allow the resolution authority for the failed clearing member time to stabilise the bank-
in-resolution. 
                                                     
65 European Commission (2015), emphasis added.  
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2. Finally, after the CCP’s waterfall has run dry, the default fund has been exhausted and 
alternative loss allocation methods applied in line with the CCP’s rules. This may be too 
late to initiate resolution, particularly if there is a possibility that the CCP may not be able 
to continue to perform its critical economic function of clearing new transactions. 
3. At an intermediate point, such as the point at which it becomes apparent that loss 
allocation will extend beyond the contribution of the failed clearing member to the default 
fund.66  Such a point would allow the resolution authority to take control of the CCP, direct 
the affairs of the CCP and make the decisions that could affect financial stability, including 
the objective of the exercise (i.e. whether the CCP should be resurrected or wound down) 
as well as the order and mix of recovery/resolution tools (e.g. replenishment of the default 
fund, implementation of margin gains haircutting and/or tear-ups). 
As part of the resolution planning exercise the resolution authority should assess the 
resolvability of the CCP and identify any impediments to resolvability.67 One impediment is 
the inability to replenish the default fund immediately, if it becomes exhausted. The default 
fund is the backstop to the margin that the defaulting clearing members post to the CCP and 
the CCP’s own skin in the game, and the default fund is the means by which CCPs mutualise 
risk. Without an adequate default fund a CCP may have difficulty in accepting new 
transactions; if so, it would not be performing its critical economic function (Gracie, 2015). 
Consequently, a key component of any CCP’s resolution plan is likely to be a statement of how 
the CCP would ensure an immediate replenishment of the default fund, if the fund were to 
become exhausted. 68 Under current rules replenishment is not immediate: at the earliest it is 
the next business day, and some CCPs allow members several weeks to come up with the 
required cash or collateral.69  
If CCPs are to be resolvable, replenishment of the default fund should be immediate. One 
possible approach is a contingent commitment facility upon which the CCP could draw if the 
default fund is exhausted and the clearing member failed to immediately fulfil the CCP’s 
request for replenishment. Another is to fund the replenishment in advance, but put this into 
escrow for use as the default fund for a bridge CCP to be taken off the ‘shelf’ and activated in 
the event that the CCP enters resolution and the losses exhaust the original default fund 
(JPMorganChase, 2014). However, both measures are not without substantial business and 
social costs, which are likely to create major obstacles for their implementation.  
Finally, resolution plans will have to reconsider the systemic implications of supplemental 
loss-allocation methods (margin gains haircutting and tear-ups).70  
                                                     
66 This is the point advocated by the FSB.  See (FSB 2016, pp. 14-15). 
67 European Commission (2015, p. 6.  
68 The level to which the default fund should be replenished is also a question that the resolution plan 
should address. This will in part depend on whether or not the plan calls for the failed FMI, once 
stabilised and restructured in resolution, to resume its prior activity levels. 
69 Nor is the replenishment obligation necessarily finite: in some CCPs members are expected to be 
‘good to the last drop,’ i.e. to keep refilling the default fund until their own capital is exhausted. 
However, such a requirement would preclude the CCP from being awarded ‘qualified’ status.  That in 
turn would require banks to hold higher capital against their exposure to the non-qualified CCP. 
70 Implementation of such measures could adversely affect financial stability (see p. 18 above).  Rather 
than run such a risk, should CCPs consider stopping at the bilateral stage? Such a ‘bilateral CCP’ might 
work as follows.  The CCP shall have two clearing members A and B.  The CCP’s contract with each of 
its clearing members will be an ISDA standard netting agreement with mutual margining above a 
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6. Conclusion and policy recommendations  
Financial stability depends on the ability of financial market infrastructures to make payments, 
settle securities and foreign exchange transactions, and clear derivatives. Consequently, it is 
important that FMIs are robust, i.e. extremely unlikely to fail and resolvable, if they do fail. 
The substantial and tangible benefits a well-functioning FMI could contribute to stabilising the 
financial system should outweigh the risk concentration problem it presents. This could only 
be realised by ensuring the robustness of both the FMIs themselves and the banks. 
Considerable progress has already been made in this direction. In particular, banks have 
greatly strengthened their condition. In line with tighter regulation and stricter supervision, 
banks have significantly increased their capital and substantially improved their liquidity. 
They have also developed recovery plans and improved governance. Taken together, these 
measures reduce the risk that a bank would fail and therefore reduce the risk to the FMIs of 
which the bank is a member. 
Banks are also becoming resolvable. This too lowers risk to FMIs because it raises the prospect 
that the bank-in-resolution can continue to meet its obligations to the FMIs of which it is a 
member. The 1st Interim Report of the CEPS Resolution Task Force outlines how the authorities 
can – under the terms of the BRRD – achieve this result. 
There is no guarantee that the authorities will succeed, however. It is still possible that a failed 
bank could default on its obligations to an FMI and that the ensuing losses could cause the 
FMI itself to fail. Such a failure could interrupt payments, stall securities settlement and/or 
block derivatives clearing. 
To avoid such systemic shocks authorities are considering how to make FMIs resolvable, such 
that, if they were to fail, they could – at no cost to the taxpayer – either be wound down in an 
orderly manner (with another FMI taking over the failed FMI’s critical economic functions) or 
be recapitalised and restructured so that the FMI could itself continue to operate. To this end, 
the FSB has developed key attributes for an effective resolution regime for FMIs, and the 
Commission is now considering legislation that would implement such attributes for FMIs in 
the EU.  
The CEPS Task Force on Financial Sector Resolution welcomes such legislation and offers the 
following recommendations: 
 Coordinate, coordinate, coordinate. By definition and design, FMIs impact the entire 
market as well as each of their participants and users. In particular, FMIs are closely 
interconnected with the global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), which are their 
                                                     
nominal threshold amount.  The contracts will be valued at mid-market rates. The margin required 
should be at least equal to the close-out amount, and consist of two parts: 
 The amount required to close out the contract utilising mid-market rates.  This will be posted by the 
out-of-the-money counterparty. Note that the CCP will have an offsetting position: the amount that 
the CCP might have to post should be equal to the amount that it should receive. 
 An amount to defray expected replacement cost.  This should equal the capital of the CCP. 
The CCP contracts will adhere to the ISDA stay protocol. In the event that A enters resolution, the stay 
protocol will kick in to allow the resolution authority of A to determine if bail-in of investor obligations 
will be sufficient to stabilise the bank. If so, A continues to meet its obligation to the CCP and close-out 
is not initiated. If bail-in has to proceed further up the creditor hierarchy, under the terms of the BRRD 
derivatives will be closed out. As the total margin posted equals the close-out amount the CCP has no 
claim on or obligation to the estate of bank A in resolution. 
22 | THOMAS F. HUERTAS 
 
principal members. FMIs are also interconnected with one another. Resolution at one FMI 
could therefore impact all G-SIBs, other FMIs and the markets at large. Consequently, 
coordination is critical, not only within the EU but also between the EU and third countries, 
especially the United States. This should start with resolution plans, continue during 
recovery/runway to resolution into the actual resolution, including both the stabilisation 
and restructuring phases for G-SIBs headquartered or active in the EU as well as for the 
FMIs inside and outside the EU in which such G-SIBs participate.  
 Don’t jump the gun. In particular, the FMI’s supervisor and resolution authority should 
coordinate closely with the resolution authorities for a failed G-SIB member. The FMI 
should give the G-SIB’s resolution authority an appropriate amount of time to attempt to 
stabilise the bank-in-resolution. This would allow the bank in resolution to continue to 
meet its obligations to the FMI, so that the FMI need not even initiate its recovery 
procedures. If necessary, the FMI supervisor should make use of its early intervention 
powers to achieve this outcome.  
 Don’t be late. There is a limit to the amount of time that the FMI can give to the resolution 
authority of the failed G-SIB, for the FMI (as well as the supervisory and resolution 
authorities responsible for the FMI) will need sufficient time to put in place the recovery 
and, if necessary, the resolution measures needed to ensure continuity of the FMI’s critical 
economic functions. 
 Identify and remedy impediments to FMI resolvability. Removing impediments to FMI 
resolvability can accelerate the resolution of the FMI (and therefore allow more time for 
the resolution authority of the failed G-SIB member to stabilise the G-SIB). In particular, 
CCPs (especially those without readily available alternatives) should take steps to ensure 
that the loss allocation (‘waterfall’) process can be completed, if necessary, over a 
‘resolution weekend’. This includes steps to accelerate the auction of the failed members’ 
positions, as well as provisions to replenish the default fund immediately, if it becomes 
exhausted. 
Taken together, these recommendations would go a very long way towards ensuring that 
FMIs could continue to operate, even under extremely adverse circumstances. That in turn 
would make a significant contribution to financial stability. 
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Annex 1. G-SIFI membership/participation in major CCPs 
Consolidated at G-SIFI group level, based on FMIs’ public websites, February 2016 
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Bank of America X X  X X X X X X X X X  
Barclays X X  X X X X X X X X X  
BNP Paribas X X X X X X X X X X X X  
Citigroup X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Credit Suisse X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Deutsche Bank X X X X X X X X X X X X  
Goldman Sachs X X X X X X X X X X X X  
HSBC X X X X X X X X X X  X X 
ING Bank X   X    X X X    
JP Morgan Chase X X X X X X X X X X X X  
Mitsubishi UFJ FG X   X    X X X X   
Mizuho FG X X  X  X  X X X X X  
Morgan Stanley X X X X X X X X X X X X  
Royal Bank of Scotland X X X X  X  X X X X   
Société Générale X X X X  X X X  X X   
Standard Chartered X         X  X X 
State Street  X  X  X   X X    
Sumitomo Mitsui FG          X X   
UBS X X X X X X X X X X X X  
Unicredit Group X X  X          
Wells Fargo X X    X X X X X    
Agricultural Bank of China              
Bank of China    X         X 
Bank of New York Mellon X   X     X X    
China Construction Bank              
Groupe BPCE              
Groupe Crédit Agricole X   X  X     X   
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
Limited 
X       X X X   X 
Nordea X X  X X         
Santander X X  X X X   X     
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